Pump runs while nobody is watching, so it is deliberately narrow: no shell, no browser, no network. It can read, write, and run one script from your project in a sandbox. Here is what stands around that script, from the inside out.
The walls
- Deno permissions. Every write and every script runs in its own process under the runtime’s flags: it may read the project, write only where it is allowed, and gets no network, no programs and no environment. This wall is always on, on every system.
- Low-integrity token. On Windows the script runs under a restricted token. Even if something slipped past Deno, Windows refuses it every write, delete or rename of anything you own; it can write only its own scratch folder.
- Kernel limits. A Windows Job Object caps its memory and allows it one process, so it cannot start anything else. On Linux, bubblewrap, when it is installed, keeps the filesystem read-only to it and gives it no network.
- Read-only reader. Every file Pump or Prop reads is opened by a separate process that may read this project only and write nothing. A fenced file stays closed to it, also through a link inside the project.
- Session token. Every page, API call and socket needs a token made fresh at each launch, so no other tab on your machine can drive PROMPIT.
- Loopback only. PROMPIT binds 127.0.0.1. Nothing on your network can reach it.
That is a layered sandbox: Deno’s permissions always, plus the operating system’s own walls wherever it offers them. A self-test runs before each run, and if the Deno wall does not hold, the run does not start. Pump’s first line says which of the operating system’s walls are on.
Everything is written down
Every action and every refusal is a line in an audit log, and each line carries the hash of the line before it. That does not stop someone with your account from editing the log, but it makes any change, deletion or insertion detectable, and names the line.
Three strikes
Some refusals happen in healthy runs. Boundary refusals should never happen: a path above the project, a credential file, a fenced file, a permission the sandbox denies. Three in one run, or a single touch of a canary: file you set as bait, and PROMPIT stops the run, writes .prompit_halt into the project, and holds every Prop on it until you remove the file. The limit is fixed on purpose, and the model cannot create or remove that file.
The alert
PROMPIT never makes a network call to tell you anything. It appends a line to alerts.jsonl, outside every project. A separate, optional script, the courier, forwards a short alert to a push server you host, and from there to your phone: the kind of event, the project’s name and the time. Never a file’s content, an audit line or a path.
And if the alerts stop altogether, the courier tells you that too. A killed alarm looks exactly like one with nothing to say.